Like worrying about my Siamese cats is not enough

Chi-America: Is This The New Global Order?

Thai Intel Comment: It is hot globally to think that China and US alliance will put in a new global order. So what is this but a bad joke about how the entire world will have to follow the Chinese and the US lead or what? Like how confusing that is that a totalitarian regime and the most democratic country will get together to influence the world. The alliance gives out one message only and that is economics is more important than humanities-and that is a recipe of failure at Titanic level. Yeah, it will probably become so, but watch out, there are still some people who are going to start to join ranks and hit back at this crazy alliance.

The following is from National Journal, a former must read by any US politician that is trying to make a come back.

The idea of a binding interdependence between China and America as the linchpin of a new global economic and political order has become a trendy one in geopolitical circles. There is much talk, for example, about Zachary Karabell’s new book, Superfusion: How China And America Became One Economy And Why The World’s Prosperity Depends On It. So, first of all, is the premise of the so-called Chi-America (or Chimerica) thesis a well-grounded one? What is true and not true of this premise? Why not, at least, “Amer-Chi,” given that the U.S. remains, by far, a bigger and wealthier economy, and a weightier global political actor?

In any case, how should Washington try to manage the Sino-American relationship — the political as well as the economic dimension? Given the global rise of China, was President Obama right, for example, recently to postpone a meeting in Washington with the Dalai Lama — until after a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao? Or did this step express too much deference towards a China that still has a long way to go before rivaling the U.S. in global influence?

 – Paul Starobin, NationalJournal.com

Dov S. Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer (2001-2004), Booz-Allen Hamilton

China is important; it is every bit as much the rising power as it claims to be. Yet we should be careful not to overstate its importance relative to those of other countries, or, for that matter, the EU. Last month’s Irish referendum in favor of the Lisbon Treaty gave the EU the green light to move forward toward more coherence, if not greater unification. As such, it will become an increasingly important force in international political, security and economic affairs, second to none in its importance to the United States .   India may not overtake China economically, but it too is a rising power, not to be ignored in the rush to crown China as America’s next major partner. Its GDP growth has been impressive, and its military modernization program, which already benefits from leading edge development in conjunction with both Europe and Israel, will progress even further as it increases its technical cooperation with the U.S. Brazil, already energy independent, is also one of the world’s top agricultural producers. Indeed, major petroleum finds…

China is important; it is every bit as much the rising power as it claims to be. Yet we should be careful not to overstate its importance relative to those of other countries, or, for that matter, the EU. Last month’s Irish referendum in favor of the Lisbon Treaty gave the EU the green light to move forward toward more coherence, if not greater unification. As such, it will become an increasingly important force in international political, security and economic affairs, second to none in its importance to the United States . 

India may not overtake China economically, but it too is a rising power, not to be ignored in the rush to crown China as America’s next major partner. Its GDP growth has been impressive, and its military modernization program, which already benefits from leading edge development in conjunction with both Europe and Israel, will progress even further as it increases its technical cooperation with the U.S.

Brazil, already energy independent, is also one of the world’s top agricultural producers. Indeed, major petroleum finds off the Brazilian coast may soon result in that country’s becoming one of the world’s top three oil exporters as well. Brazil has, in fact, weathered the financial crisis as well as any of the major devleoped nations.

Let us recall that it was not too long ago that Japan was seen as the next great American rival, a threat to buy up every major American asset. Japan’s decades-long recession put paid to that threat, though not before several pundits made tidy sums selling Japan-bashing books that became best sellers.

Just as Japan hit an economic bump from which it has yet to recover, China too has the potential to run into trouble. Migration to the cities, as well as unemployment, remains a nightmare for the Beijing leadership. Global warming is rendering the Chinese north even more impoverished, and exacerbating the gap between the north and the prosperous south.China must remain on its economic growth treadmill, recording 8 per cent GDP growth or better, if it is not to face major internal dislocations.

Perhaps China will maintain its economic balance, but we cannot be sure. And so we cannot as yet create a new Chinese-American bipolar world, although no doubt there will be many analysts whose vision of such a world will get them on the New York Times best sellers list for what will purportedly be non-fiction.   

Ron Marks, Senior Vice President for Government Relations, Oxford-Analytica

One of the interesting parts about working with a British-American firm is listening to btoh sides speak of the “special realtionship” between the two countries.  For the British, it is a special relationship.  For America, not so much.  Britain is the old girlfriend that we want to maintain a relationship, occasionally take out to dinner, but don’t really want to go much further.  They think Athens to Rome.  We think they are Athens, Georgia. So, what does this have to do with China.  Every time I hear about some grand alliance of their interests with our, I cannot imagine it.  We are hardly a supplicant at this point.  And they are hardly a superpower.  But, both sides — Washington and Beijing — will act in their own interests.  Sometimes those interests will conflict lie over Taiwan and human rights.  Sometimes they will converge like on North Korea. That being said, we are in an interesting dance right now. Beijing is gaining economic power and some additional clout around the world.  For the time being, we a…

One of the interesting parts about working with a British-American firm is listening to btoh sides speak of the “special realtionship” between the two countries.  For the British, it is a special relationship.  For America, not so much.  Britain is the old girlfriend that we want to maintain a relationship, occasionally take out to dinner, but don’t really want to go much further.  They think Athens to Rome.  We think they are Athens, Georgia.

So, what does this have to do with China.  Every time I hear about some grand alliance of their interests with our, I cannot imagine it.  We are hardly a supplicant at this point.  And they are hardly a superpower.  But, both sides — Washington and Beijing — will act in their own interests.  Sometimes those interests will conflict lie over Taiwan and human rights.  Sometimes they will converge like on North Korea.

That being said, we are in an interesting dance right now. Beijing is gaining economic power and some additional clout around the world.  For the time being, we are a big fat debtor nation — as we have done at many points in our history.  We owe them a lot of money. I’ll go with the old aphorism — you owe the bank a little and you have a problem.  You owe the bank a lot and you have a friend. For now, Beijing will do us no harm economically beside occassionally yank our chain about various policies.

Christian Caryl, Senior Fellow at MIT Center for International Studies, and, Contributing Editor for both Foreign Policy and Newsweek

Updated at 10:06 a.m. on Nov. 2. The Chimerica idea is sexy. China’s growth is dramatic; America’s current account deficits are scary. So it’s very exciting to focus on the relationship between the two. But this paradigm leaves out just a bit too much to be really useful. America’s biggest trade partner is not China but the European Union. Japan holds almost as much Treasury debt as China. And there are quite a few other countries that are also racking up growth rates just as impressive as China’s, even if they aren’t quite in the same league as American trade partners – yet. In the second quarter of this year India recorded annualized GDP growth of 6.1 percent – not shabby at all. The world’s economy is much, much bigger (and messier) than the bilateral relationship between China and America. China is, of course, a very important country. I don’t doubt that it will soon become the world’s number two economy and can imagine a day when it might well become number one. And yet I think the single-minded focus on its relationship to the US is deeply m…

The Chimerica idea is sexy. China’s growth is dramatic; America’s current account deficits are scary. So it’s very exciting to focus on the relationship between the two.

But this paradigm leaves out just a bit too much to be really useful.

America’s biggest trade partner is not China but the European Union.

Japan holds almost as much Treasury debt as China. And there are quite a few other countries that are also racking up growth rates just as impressive as China’s, even if they aren’t quite in the same league as American trade partners – yet. In the second quarter of this year India recorded annualized GDP growth of 6.1 percent – not shabby at all. The world’s economy is much, much bigger (and messier) than the bilateral relationship between China and America.

China is, of course, a very important country. I don’t doubt that it will soon become the world’s number two economy and can imagine a day when it might well become number one. And yet I think the single-minded focus on its relationship to the US is deeply misguided.

We seem to forget that, as China rises, so, too, do countries like India, Indonesia, and Brazil. Many members of Washington’s power elite still seem to be fixating on a bygone age when a few leading nations – the US, Germany, Japan – called the shots. Today, by contrast, the global economy is becoming more diverse by the day, less concentrated rather than more. Against this backdrop all the talk of a G2 sounds misguided; as big as they are, not even China and America together can solve all the problems of a much messier world. The G20 is a far more accurate reflection of global realities. So it will be harder to get things done in a group with that many members? Get used to it. As far as China is concerned, Washington’s tone should be respectful, businesslike, and unemotional – nothing more, nothing less.

Michael Vlahos, Fellow and Principal, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory

Chimerica (ChiCom) Chimera? Perhaps Homer and Hesiod is after all a good place to begin: A fantabuous creature that Billy Mumy might have cobbled together in the dark reaches of the Twilight Zone from the parts of multiple animals: the body of a lioness, a tail ending in a snake’s head, the head of a goat rising from her back at mid-spine. That would be Chimerica. I write this looking back from the chiaroscuro terror of the early 1950s. A movie I must have seen at age 6 — Steel Helmet — existentially attuned me in my nightmares to a vision not so distant from Orwell’s 1984. To Americans who lived through that dark sink of consciousness perhaps Chimerica seems truly chimerical. But then there are my little children, happily soaking up Ni Hao, Kai-Lan on Noggin — and the Chimera looks like Darwin intended — genetically counterintuitive. This is of course is the now-way to see a Chimerica future. What is Chimerica? Well don’t you know? It is all about us. Call it late modernity’s grandest and greatest co-dependency: They stuff Walmart and we let them buy…

Chimerica (ChiCom) Chimera?

Perhaps Homer and Hesiod is after all a good place to begin: A fantabuous creature that Billy Mumy might have cobbled together in the dark reaches of the Twilight Zone from the parts of multiple animals: the body of a lioness, a tail ending in a snake’s head, the head of a goat rising from her back at mid-spine.

 That would be Chimerica.

 I write this looking back from the chiaroscuro terror of the early 1950s. A movie I must have seen at age 6 — Steel Helmet — existentially attuned me in my nightmares to a vision not so distant from Orwell’s 1984.

To Americans who lived through that dark sink of consciousness perhaps Chimerica seems truly chimerical. But then there are my little children, happily soaking up Ni Hao, Kai-Lan on Noggin — and the Chimera looks like Darwin intended — genetically counterintuitive.

 This is of course is the now-way to see a Chimerica future.

What is Chimerica? Well don’t you know? It is all about us. Call it late modernity’s grandest and greatest co-dependency: They stuff Walmart and we let them buy our dollars. Pretty good deal.

Americans generally understand this symbiosis. Some see it as threatening — mostly in the United States Navy, desperate to rediscover a long-sunk Mahanian fleet to fight, requiting angst from losing its precious Samurai-warrior enemy so many years ago.

But consider actual reality. What is China? What is the United States? And please, try not to flow into the molecular “now-conversation.” Just try jumping into the not-so-distant future.

The United States and China are today’s anchors of humanity. This does not mean that they are somehow inclusive or even embracing, but rather simply that these are the two most effective centers of humanity at this time — and at this time may be an important data point.

I believe that humanity is heading, whether it wishes to see this or not, to a crisis of globalization. Climate change, a coming energy crunch, and the negative consequences of human activity worldwide (as in, dying, anoxic oceans) will in just a few years become the urgent agenda for all societies everywhere. Severe water shortage, famine, and pandemic: these are, like or not, our shared human future.

The United States — as part of North America — is well positioned to weather the storm. China is in a far more vulnerable situation. Yet China like the US today is the global center of innovation and creative thinking. Our economies are also inextricably intertwined.

If in the next twenty years China faces the terrible challenges of massive desertification, death of its rivers and seas, massive weather events, and the stress of water shortages as Himalyan glaciers disappear — plus the famine that follows — The Question is:

Will the United States step up to the plate and ensure the survival of China?

So you see, this is not about some replay of “The Great Game” — Cigar grand strategy in a Victorian Gentleman’s club — nor is this is about a recherché to rediscover the perfect — and all-giving — new bi-polar world.

To be honest — the question begs itself by implication — India will be just as critical and essential as China in our future — and if this is a truly stressed collective future, the incumbency is on the United States to help save literally a third of humanity. The 3 billion Chinese and Indians of 2030 are — in sacred terms from our own and still-surviving mythic national mission — Our charge.

However slowly it works its way into our day-to-day consciousness: Our world is transitioning right now from its ancient (which is to say Cold War) neuralgias … To something entirely different. Most visible are the “people movements” — the riotous proliferation of non-state groups and movements, like a global Petrie Dish — unfolding before us without respect to future earth shocks waiting in the wings.

All of this strongly suggests a new vantage for us. It is a challenge to step back a bit from national security neuralgias, but we must. Can you?

Only then can we even begin as American to get ready to be leaders of a future we did not anticipate — and yet which nonetheless faces us ferociously.

If on the other hand we cannot face this thing, then our historical marker will become, year-by-year, increasingly clear. What we shirk — starting with China — will become the testament of how, over time, we fail our own posterity.

And they will be our sternest jury, and also, our final judge.

Michael Brenner, Professor of International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh

Sun Rise, Sun Set  

The sun rising in the East continues its ascent even while we distract ourselves in Iraq and Afghanistan. The shadows that it is casting over the international scene are visible nearly everywhere. Here at home, they noticeably darken the outlook for the country’s troubled financial prospects. The challenge to thinking through the full implications of China’s growing strength and confidence lies at once in its immensity and in its pervasive effects on all manner of international affairs.

It makes sense to begin with the big picture. In historical perspective, there is reason to expect a clash between today’s dominant power (the United States) and its putative rival. That configuration has led to direct conflict at every historical juncture except one – the transition from pax Britannica to American predominance. That exception is generally understood in terms of unique affinities and few differences over core interests. The latter had something to do with geography. A simple extrapolation of the logic at work in other eras points to a Sino-American contest for being ‘king of the hill.’ Such a rough comparison is inadequate, though. For all other things in the equation are not equal. What has changed in the world is the twin phenomena of deep economic interdependence and material well-being reaching at the apex of peoples’ wants and desires. The apparent correlation of the latter with internal political liberalization offers further encouragement that a status /power sharing arrangement might be arrived at without bloodshed or other nasty confrontations.

This, of course, is pure Kant – not just as a superimposed intellectual construct but a logic supported by actual developments in the world we inhabit. A very large segment of world affairs, defined both sectorally and geographically, does represent a partial reification of the Kantian vision, objectively speaking. American strategic attitudes toward China for the past two decades have followed this logic and have been grounded on that perceived reality. It is a bet of historic dimensions made for high stakes – the future stability of the international system. To state its underlying precepts simply, they are: (1) economic development roughly along free market lines brings with it an attendant political liberalization, even if the lag time is unknowable; (2) countries whose political system makes leaders accountable to the populace – preferably directly, possibly indirectly too – are likely to be peaceable in their external relation; (3) countries that place the greatest importance on economic well-being are less likely to be aggressive because of both the financial costs and, above all, the disruption of the fruitful economic ties across national borders; and (4) therefore, the more extensively China, and its economy, can be enmeshed in global markets and multilateral institutions for maintaining them, the better the prospects that China’s mounting power will not manifest itself in military actions or expansionist, empire building projects generally.

The United States, at the same time, has kept a strong military presence in the Pacific and East Asia so as to reinforce this logic by maintaining disincentives for aggressive behavior. This containment component of American strategy aims to remove temptation, e.g. South Korea and Japan, and to create an existential counterforce to any Chinese illicit ambitions. Taiwan, needless to say, is the most ticklish issue. Sooner or later, China expects its integration with the mainland in some form or other. The question is whether the larger strategic context will induce China to extend the time frame and loosen the notion of what integration means.

Even an optimistic view of Chinese power/influence progression cannot elide the many places and instances where there will be frictions. It is worthwhile to delineate them. Before doing so, it is useful to highlight a couple of features of Sino-American relations that will be omnipresent background factors. By far the most significant is that China is now and, as far as the eye can see, will be the United States’ creditor. The latter’s chronic budget deficits, trade deficits and currency value can only be managed with China’s benign assistance. It is incontrovertibly true that mutual dependence on stable global finance creates something of an economic Mutual Assured Destruction situation. None the less, this pronounced asymmetry cannot fail to exercise some constraint on American behavior toward China. For there are easy ways by which China’s action in the financial realm could generate immediate pressures on the American economy. The psychological effect, barely visible today, can be expected to grow down the road.

The second background factor derives from history. China traditionally has not been in the empire building business. It feels neither compulsion to achieve glory nor confirmation of its national mission by controlling directly other places and peoples. As noted back in May:

China mtches the United States in the depth of its belief in its own exceptionality. Historically, China as Heaven’s Middle Kingdom was felt to stand at the summit of earthly attainments. There is a basic difference between the two countries’ self image, however. The United States’ sense of exceptionality and uniqueness is closely tied to its sense of mission as model and agent of world progress. Others are presumed to emulate the United States in aspiring to its achievements. The Chinese by contrast have no sense of mission. After all, to their way of thinking, no other people is capable of matching them. This may be a good thing in that there is no inevitable clash between two proselytizing nations.”

Against this background, here is a notation of foreseeable points of friction that one can envisage.

Resource conflicts – especially over dwindling energy supplies. Consequences are already evident in Central Asia, Iran and the Gulf, Africa, and the South China Sea where politics intersects economics. Less charged competition for minerals is also evident.

• Multilateral interventions for humanitarian, peacekeeping or peacemaking missions.

• International monetary matters. Recent Chinese initiatives are the harbinger are more serious efforts to reduce the role of the dollar as the international transaction and reserve currency of choice.

• Power shares in multinational organizations – above all the International Monetary Fund for reasons indicated above.

Perhaps the greatest challenge the United States faces is the diplomatic one. This refers not only to direct dealings with China but also dealings with those issues where China will be a party one way or another. That means most matters of consequence. Incorporating the diplomatic factor into our foreign policy making never has been an American forte – especially where we do not control the field of action. We are strongly inclined to take our own counsel, make judgments and then declare our policy with the expectation that most will see the virtue of how we approach affairs and what we want to do about them. Consider policy-making on Iraq and Afghanistan. Contrast it to policy-making on Iran where the slighting of others is a big liability and where we have encountered difficulty in orchestrating an international strategy.

In short, China already is beginning to change just about everything.

James Mann, Author-In-Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

The talk of “Chi-America” is the popular version of the ongoing policy debates about whether the United States and China should team up as a “G-2” to try to coordinate their policies around the world, in a way that would place China above other countries or groups of countries (Europe,Japan, Russia, India) in strategic importance.

As a practical matter, I think that over the past year we have already seen the first signs of an “economic G-2.” The U.S. and China worked closely together to stimulate their economies after the Wall Street upheavals of 2008, at a time when other major countries were far more reluctant to do so. This economic cooperation has been heralded as a success and worked in some ways, but it has not produced any significant change in the value of the undervalued Chinese renminbi. During the 2008 campaign, then-candidates Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton both denounced China for holding down the value of its currency – and as soon as they took office, they changed their tune.